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Abstract
Organisations disclose their privacy practices
by posting privacy policies on their website.
Even though users often care about their dig-
ital privacy, they often don’t read privacy poli-
cies since they require a significant investment
in time and effort. Although natural language
processing can help in privacy policy under-
standing, there has been a lack of large scale
privacy policy corpora that could be used to
analyse, understand, and simplify privacy poli-
cies. Thus, we create PrivaSeer, a corpus of
over one million English language website pri-
vacy policies, which is significantly larger than
any previously available corpus. We design
a corpus creation pipeline which consists of
crawling the web followed by filtering doc-
uments using language detection, document
classification, duplicate and near-duplication
removal, and content extraction. We investi-
gate the composition of the corpus and show
results from readability tests, document simi-
larity, keyphrase extraction, and explored the
corpus through topic modeling.
1 Introduction
A privacy policy is a legal document that is used
by an organisation to disclose how they collect,
analyze, share, and protect users’ personal infor-
mation. Legal jurisdictions around the world re-
quire organisations to make their privacy policies
readily available to their users, and laws such as
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the
European Union and California Online Privacy Pro-
tection Act (CalOPPA) in the United States place
specific expectations upon privacy policies. How-
ever, most internet users fail to understand privacy
policies (Meiselwitz, 2013). Studies show that pri-
vacy policies require a considerable investment in
time to read (Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018) and
estimate that it would require approximately 200
hours to read all the privacy policies that an average
person would come across every year (McDonald
and Cranor, 2008).
Although most users are concerned about their
online privacy, Rudolph et al. (2018) reports that a
significant number do not make the effort to read
privacy notices because they perceive them to be
too time-consuming or too complicated (Obar and
Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018). While studies have sug-
gested methods to improve the perception and ac-
cessibility of privacy policies by making improve-
ments in the manner of presentation of the pol-
icy, these improvements have not been adopted
by many organisations. For example, Kelley et al.
(2010) design and test a “privacy nutrition label”
approach to present information. They found that
users report higher accuracy, speed, and enjoyment
in finding privacy information from a privacy nu-
trition label than from a standard privacy policy.
Similarly, Schaub et al. (2015) introduce methods
to ease the design of privacy notices and their inte-
gration.
A considerable amount of time and effort is re-
quired to understand the contents of privacy poli-
cies, and natural language processing (NLP) pro-
vides an opportunity to automate extraction of
salient details from these documents. Existing re-
search has achieved some success using small cor-
pora of privacy policies, on the order of a few hun-
dred (Wilson et al., 2016) (Zimmeck et al., 2019)
or a thousand (Ramanath et al., 2014). In order
to better leverage state-of-the-art NLP techniques,
a large collection of privacy policies is necessary.
Also, analyzing a large corpus of website privacy
policies will inform the current state of privacy
practices on the web and assist the research com-
munity in addressing and understanding pressing
privacy issues.
As such, we make the following contributions:
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• Create the PrivaSeer Corpus1: a corpus of one
million English language website privacy policies,
which is larger than any other prior corpus.
• Design a detailed pipeline to further gather pri-
vacy policies.
• Explore the corpus by presenting an analysis of
readability, key phrases, topics, and similarity com-
parisons of these policies.
2 Related Work
Although there is a lack of a web-scale corpus
of privacy policies, much work has been made at
analysing privacy policies. Some prior attempts at
analysis involved manual analysis of privacy poli-
cies. Jensen and Potts (2004) evaluate the accessi-
bility, writing, and content of 64 privacy policies.
Cranor et al. (2013) compare the privacy policies
of over 3000 financial institutions and report on a
range of data collection practices.
Various automated attempts at analysis have
been based on small sets of privately collected cor-
pora. Costante et al. (2012) use a machine learn-
ing model to check the completeness of privacy
policies and provide the user with the degree of
coverage of important privacy policy categories us-
ing a corpus of 64 privacy policies. Analyses of
readability show that privacy policies are difficult
to read and require a college-level reading ability
(Ermakova et al.) (Fabian et al., 2017).
Previous releases of a corpus of privacy policies
have led to a wide variety of research activity. Wil-
son et al. (2016) released the OPP-115 Corpus, a
publicly available dataset of 115 privacy policies
with manual annotations of 23k fine-grained data
practices, and demonstrated the feasibility of partly
automating the annotation process. The OPP-115
Corpus was used to create Polysis (Harkous et al.,
2018), a system that uses deep learning to clas-
sify text in privacy policies and answer non-factoid
questions. Similarly, the OPP-115 Corpus was used
to train ten different machine learning models to
summarise 400 privacy policies and answer prede-
fined questions (Zaeem et al., 2018). The OPP-115
Corpus was further used to evaluate embeddings
created from 150,000 Android Google Play Store
app privacy policies (Kumar et al., 2019).
Few other publicly available website privacy pol-
icy corpora exist. Ramanath et al. (2014) released
a corpus of 1010 website privacy policies and intro-
1Corpus URL pending paper acceptance. Search engine
can be accessed at http://privaseer.ist.psu.edu/
duced an unsupervised approach to aligning privacy
policy sections. Zimmeck et al. (2019) released a
set of over 400k URLs to Android app privacy pol-
icy pages collected by crawling the Google Play
store. They reported that 30% of the URLs do not
link to analysable privacy policies. Their analysis
on the policies include classification of various pri-
vacy practices and analysing potential compliance
issues on 350 annotated policies.
3 Document Collection
We used Common Crawl2 to gather seed URLs
to crawl for privacy policies from the web, as we
describe in detail below. We filtered the Common
Crawl URLs to get a set of possible links to web site
privacy policies. We then crawled the filtered set
to obtain candidate privacy policy documents. The
complete pipeline from the Common Crawl URL
dump to the gold standard privacy policy corpus is
shown in Figure 1.
3.1 Common Crawl
The Common Crawl Foundation is a non-profit
which has been releasing large monthly internet
web crawls since 2008. Monthly crawl archives
provide a “snapshot of the web” by including re-
crawls of popular domains (re-crawls from previ-
ous archives) and crawls of new domains. Common
Crawl has also been releasing a domain-level we-
bgraph from which the harmonic centrality of the
crawled domains are calculated. This webgraph
is used to sample popular domains that need to be
re-crawled and to obtain new uncrawled domains.
We downloaded the URL dump of the May, 2019
archive. Common Crawl reports that the archive
contains 2.65 billion web pages or 220 TB of un-
compressed content which were crawled between
19th and 27th of May, 2019. They also report
that this archive contains 825 million URLs which
were not contained in any previously released crawl
archives. We applied a selection criteria on the
downloaded URL dump to filter the URLs of likely
privacy policy pages.
3.2 URL Selection
The online privacy paradigm follows the “Notice
and Choice” framework. “Notice” is a presentation
of terms usually in the form of a privacy policy and
“Choice” is an action signifying the acceptance of
terms (Sloan and Warner, 2014). As a consequence,
2https://commoncrawl.org/
Figure 1: Corpus creation pipeline
organisations generally include a link to their pri-
vacy policy in the footer of the website landing
page. Common names for this link are “Privacy
Policy”, “Privacy Notice”, and “Data Protection”.
A secondary consequence of this informal stan-
dardisation is that privacy policy URLs also tend to
have those words in them. Thus, we selected those
URLs which had the word “privacy” or the words
“data” and “protection” from the Common Crawl
URL archive. We were able to extract 3.9 million
URLs that fit this selection criterion. Informal ex-
periments suggested that this selection of keywords
was optimal for retrieving the most privacy policies
with as few false positives as possible.
3.3 Web Crawling
We crawled the 3.9 million selected URLs using
Scrapy3 for about 48 hours between the 4th and
10th of August 2019, for a few hours each day. 3.2
million URLs were successfully crawled while 0.4
million led to error pages and 0.3 million URLs
were discarded as duplicates. While the full list
consists of 76 different types of errors, Table 1 lists
error types that had more than 10,000 instances.
The table consists of HTTP errors and Scrapy er-
rors which were thrown when no response was
received from the queried page. We call these 3.2
million crawled web pages “candidate privacy pol-
icy documents” as it is uncertain how many are
indeed privacy policies.
4 Document Filtering
To filter privacy policies from the candidates, we
first determined the language of the candidates and
selected only those that were in English. We then
implemented a random forest classifier to separate
the privacy policy web pages from the candidates.
3https://scrapy.org/
Error Number
Page Not Found (404) 152,732
Forbidden (405) 50,004
DNS Lookup Error 24,599
Internal Server Error (500) 19,170
Service Unavailable (503) 17,062
TCP Timeout Error 11,330
Response Never Received 10,597
Table 1: Crawling errors
We further filtered out web pages that did not follow
the “Notice and Choice” framework. Finally, we
removed boilerplate from the privacy policy web
pages and discarded duplicates to arrive at the gold
standard corpus.
4.1 Language Detection
In order to identify the language (English vs oth-
ers) of the candidate documents, we used the open-
source Python package Langid (Lui and Baldwin,
2012). Langid is an off-the-shelf Naive Bayes-
based classifier pretrained on 97 different lan-
guages which is able to achieve consistently high
accuracy over a wide range of languages, domains,
and lengths of text. We used Langid due to its
convenience and high accuracy in language identi-
fication. Figure 2 depicts the language distribution
of the top ten most common languages in the can-
didate set. The complete set of documents was
divided into 97 languages and an unknown lan-
guage category. We found that the vast majority of
documents were in English. We discarded candi-
date documents that were not identified as English
by Langid and were left with 2.1 million candidate
documents.
Figure 2: Candidate documents language distribution
4.2 Document Classification
The English language candidate document set con-
sisted of web pages that satisfied our URL selection
criteria. Thus it was important to separate privacy
policy documents from ones that fit our criteria but
were not actual privacy policies. We experimented
with supervised and unsupervised approaches and
attempted to classify documents using the URL of
the web page and a bag of words approach.
4.2.1 Labelling
One of the researchers in the team spent eight hours
labelling 1000 randomly selected candidate docu-
ments. Out of 1000, 740 were privacy policies and
260 were not privacy policies. Out of the docu-
ments that did not have privacy policies, 93 had
news articles, 27 were pages which had links to
the privacy policy, 13 were e-commerce product
pages, 12 were pages which advertised security de-
vices, 6 were Twitter pages and the rest were other
miscellaneous pages.
4.2.2 Unsupervised Machine Learning
For the unsupervised approach, we uniformly ran-
domly sampled 100,000 documents and experi-
mented with K-Means (Lloyd, 1982) and DBSCAN
(Ester et al.) algorithms. We tested our models us-
ing Doc2Vec (Le and Mikolov, 2014) and term
frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf) vec-
torization techniques. The Doc2Vec technique was
used to create 256 dimensional vectors and the tf-
idf technique created vectors equal to the size of
the vocabulary. Both were further reduced to 50
by using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). A
cosine distance metric was used to compare the
document distances.
Figure 3: DBSCAN separated candidate document dis-
tribution
For the K-Means algorithm, using Doc2Vec vec-
tors we experimented with cluster sizes between
2 and 30 and could not find a clear elbow point.
As manual analysis of documents for various clus-
ter sizes did not reveal an intuitive explanation for
formed clusters, we discarded the results. While us-
ing the tf-idf vectors, although a clear elbow point
was found at 7 clusters, a single cluster was found
to contain almost all the documents while the rest
of the clusters had between 1 and 1500 documents.
As this did not seem like a reasonable separation,
we discarded the results.
For the DBSCAN algorithm, using Doc2Vec
vectors, over 70% of the data points fell into the
noise category for any reasonable range of hyper-
parameters. As this did not seem reasonable, we
discarded the results. Finally, while using the tf-idf
vectors, after hyper-parameter tuning using 200 la-
belled samples we found that two well defined clus-
ters were formed with 80% of the samples falling
under a single category and the other 20% falling
under the noise category. The evaluation of this
model can be found in Table 2. Figure 3 shows
the class distribution of the 100,000 samples. In
the figure, the points colored blue represent the
single positive cluster while the points colored red
represent noise.
4.2.3 Supervised Machine Learning
We trained a random forest classifier on 1000 man-
ually labelled documents using features extracted
from the URLs and the words in the web page.
We trained three separate models: one using the
features extracted from the URL, one using the
features extracted from the web page, and one com-
bined model using features from both.
For the URL model, the words in the URL path
were extracted and the tf-idf of each term was
recorded to create the features. As privacy pol-
icy URLs tend to be shorter and have fewer path
segments, they were added as features. As the
Model Precision Recall F1
DBSCAN 0.81 0.83 0.82
URL Based 0.86 0.91 0.88
Document Based 0.93 0.94 0.93
Combined 0.95 0.98 0.97
Table 2: Document classification
classes were unbalanced, we over-sampled from
the minority class using the synthetic minority over-
sampling technique (Chawla et al., 2002). For the
document model, we used tf-idf features after tok-
enizing the document using a regex tokenizer and
removing stop words. The combined model was
a combination of the URL and document features.
All the above models were trained using random
forest classifiers.
The 1000 labelled documents were divided into
800 samples for training and 200 samples for test-
ing. Table 2 shows the comparison of the results
of all the above models. As the combined model
had the best results, we retrained the model using
all the 1000 labelled documents and ran it on the
candidate document set. Out of 2.1 million English
candidate privacy polices, 1.54 million were classi-
fied as privacy policies and the rest were discarded.
4.3 URL Cross Verification
Legal jurisdictions around the world require or-
ganisations to make their privacy policies readily
available to their users. As a result, most organ-
isations include a link to their privacy policy in
the footer of their website landing page. In order
to release a corpus of privacy policies that were
legally authoritative, we cross-verified the URLs
of the privacy policies in our corpus with those that
we obtained by crawling the homepages (landing
page) of these domains.
Between the 8th and 10th November 2019, we
crawled the homepage and links (in the homepage)
which fit our previously defined URL selection cri-
teria of all the domains in our corpus. We then
gathered the URLs satisfying our selection criteria
in order to cross-verify the URLs in our existing
corpus. This approach was employed because we
found that some websites did not directly link to
their privacy policy. Instead, they had an intermedi-
ary page from the landing page which had links to
privacy related documents. After cross-verifying
the URLs, we were left with 1.1 million privacy
policy web pages.
4.4 Content Extraction
Privacy policies that were collected were found
in the bodies of web pages and contained content
other than the privacy policy. Many web pages had
a header, a footer, and a left hand navigation menu
in addition to banners and advertisements. We refer
to this extra content in a web page as boilerplate.
Because boilerplate would not contribute to the
enrichment of the corpus, we added boilerplate
removal to our pipeline.
We used an open-source Python package called
Dragnet (Peters and Lecocq, 2013) for this task.
Dragnet uses a machine learning approach based
on features extracted from text and link density of
the Document Object Model (DOM) elements in
the web wage. It also extracts semantic features
from the names of HTML tag attributes. We used
Dragnet due to its consistently high accuracy and
ease of use. We implemented Dragnet on the 1.1
million privacy policy web pages thus removing
boilerplate from the web pages.
4.5 Duplicate and Near-Duplicate Detection
Detecting duplicate and near-duplicate documents
is an essential step for any corpus cleaning task.
We tackled the problem of removing exact dupli-
cates by hashing all the raw documents and dis-
carding multiple copies of exact hashes. Exact
duplicate removal was performed before the URL
cross-verification task in the pipeline.
To tackle the problem of near-duplicate de-
tection, we used Simhashing (Charikar, 2002).
Simhashing is a hashing technique in which sim-
ilar inputs produce similar Simhashes. After the
Simhash of each document is created, the document
similarity is measured by calculating the Hamming
distance between the document Simhashes (Manku
et al., 2007). The implementation of the Simhash
algorithm created 64 bit hashes. We first used the
shingling (Broder et al., 1997) technique to create
shingles of size 3 for each privacy policy. We then
ran the Simhash algorithm on each of the shingled
documents to obtain its 64 bit Simhash.
In order to find the near-duplicate documents,
we separated the documents by their domain and
only compared Simhashes of documents that were
from the same domain. This approach was taken
since a few privacy policies had very similar word-
ing, differing only by the organisation name or the
website name (this finding is further discussed in
Section 5).We found abundant examples of near-
Figure 4: Document length distribution
duplicate privacy policies on the same website. A
typical example of this is observed when websites
are available in multiple languages. Often, when
websites are available in multiple languages, the
privacy policies are in the same language across
all the website locales with few or no changes be-
tween them. Thus, it is important to filter these
near-duplicates which do not add any extra infor-
mation.
Having separated the document URLs by their
domain, we compared the Simhashes of all the
documents within the same domain and obtained
a list of all pairs of similar documents based on
a Hamming distance threshold. We then filtered
the duplicates based on a greedy approach. The
remaining documents comprised the corpus.
5 Corpus Analysis
The corpus consists of 1,005,781 privacy policies
from 995,487 different web domains. Figure 4
shows a histogram of lengths of the privacy poli-
cies in number of words. Privacy policies in this
corpus have a mean word length of about 1410
words and range between a minimum of 24 words
and a maximum of above 71k words and remov-
ing outliers more than 6 standard deviations away.
Further distribution of lengths are in Table 3.
Figure 5 shows a bar chart of the distribution of
the top ten top level domains (TLD) of the policies
in the corpus. The corpus has policies from over
800 different TLDs. While .com, .org, .net and
.info make up a major share of the corpus, country-
level domains like .uk, .au, .ca and .du depict the
variety of the source of privacy policies.
5.1 Readability
Readability of a text can be defined as the ease of
understanding or comprehension due to the style
of writing (Klare et al., 1963). Along with length,
readability does play a part in internet users’ deci-
sions to either read or ignore a privacy policy (Er-
Figure 5: Domain distribution
Metric Min. Max. Mean Sd.
Words 24 71937 1410.88 1366.46
FRES -163.41 117.16 40.32 14.20
FKG -1.9 83.4 14.42 4.36
SMOG 3.1 31.0 15.51 2.27
CLI 2.29 25.83 12.75 1.44
Table 3: Average readability scores (Min. = Minimum,
Max.= Maximum, Sd. = Standard Deviation)
makova et al.). Since no single readability measure
comprehensively captures readability, we report the
readability of the privacy policies in our corpus on
well established formulae, namely, Flesch Read-
ability Ease Score (FRES) , Flesh-Kincaid Grade
Level (FKG), Simple Measure of Gobbledygook
(SMOG), Coleman-Liau Index (CLI).
The readability scores on all the metrics follow
a normal distribution for the privacy policies in the
corpus. Table 3 shows the distribution of the scores.
As indicated by the FRES score, the readability of
the privacy policies range from very easy to read
(scores between 80 - 100) to very difficult to read
(scores between 0 - 20) with the mean score of
40 suggesting that on average privacy policies are
difficult to comprehend. The FKG scores suggest
that a few years of college education is required
to understand the average privacy policy. This is
backed up by the SMOG scores which suggest
that around 15 years of formal education (which
amounts to a college junior or sophomore) is re-
quired. The most optimistic scores come from CLI
which suggests that the average privacy policy is at
the reading level of a college freshman. These re-
sults are consistent with prior research and suggest
that on average privacy policies are difficult to read
and are at the college reading level.
5.2 Topic Modelling
Topic modelling is an unsupervised machine learn-
ing method which extracts the most probable dis-
tribution of words into topics through an iterative
process. We used topic modelling to explore the
distribution of privacy practices in our corpus.
The OPP-115 Corpus (Wilson et al., 2016) in-
troduced a labeling scheme of privacy practices
based on input from legal experts. They followed
a bottom-up approach and identified different cat-
egories from analysis of data practices in privacy
policies. We followed a top-down approach and
applied topic modelling to the corpus in order to
extract common themes for paragraphs.
We used Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), an
unsupervised approach to topic modelling. As topic
modelling with LDA works well when each input
document deals with a single topic, we divided
each privacy policy into its constituent paragraphs
(Sarne et al., 2019), tokenized the paragraphs using
a regex character matching tokenizer and lemma-
tised the individual words using NLTK’s WordNet
lemmatizer4. As the number of topics is a param-
eter that needs to be tuned for an LDA model, we
experimented with topics sizes of 6, 7, 8, 10 and
15. We manually evaluated the topic clusters by
inspecting the words that most represented the top-
ics. We noted that the cohesiveness of the topics
decreased as the number of topics increased. We
chose a topic size of 7, since larger topic sizes
produced markedly less coherent topics.
The vocabulary for each topic and an interpreted
category name is shown in Figure 4. The terms
listed in the vocabulary column represent the topic
in decreasing order of probabilities, cutoff at a
threshold. While some of the topics found us-
ing our technique match the ones introduced by
Wilson et al. (2016) using the OPP-115 Corpus,
we found that a few fine-grained privacy practice
categorizations appeared as separate topics in our
method. The topics First Party Collection, Third
Party Collection and Policy Change match the OPP-
115 Corpus categorization, while the topics Euro-
pean Audiences, Cookies and Tracking and Dis-
closure of Information appear as subcategories of
International and Specific Audiences, First Party
Collection and Third Party Collection in the OPP-
115 Corpus respectively. The topic Data Security
and Contact appears to be a combination of the
OPP-115 Corpus Data Security category and the
Other category. It is likely that the misalignment of
OPP-115 categories and LDA topics comes from a
difference in approaches: the OPP-115 categories
represent themes that privacy experts expect to find
4http://nltk.org/
in privacy policies, which diverge from the actual
distribution of themes in this genera of text.
5.3 Keyphrase Extraction
Given the issues with length, readability, and the
time investment necessary in reading a privacy pol-
icy, keywords and keyphrases lend themselves well
to summarizing the content of a privacy policy. In
order to summarize the content of the corpus and to
depict the performance of classic keyphrase extrac-
tion techniques on privacy policies, we used two
well established keyphrase extraction techniques
on the privacy policies of the corpus - RAKE (Rose
et al., 2010) and TextRank (Mihalcea and Tarau,
2004).
Top keyphrases shown in Table 5 were obtained
using both the RAKE and TextRank algorithms.
We ran both algorithms separately on all the pri-
vacy policies. Scores of keyphrases obtained for
each privacy policy were normalized and summed
up to obtain the final scores. The keyphrases shown
in the table are among the top 50 keyphrases. Some
of the keyphrases were omitted as they represented
redundant information. From the table, we can see
how information from different sections of the pri-
vacy policy have been captured. For example, the
phrases email address, ip address, phone number,
and credit card information are all suggestive of 1st
party user information that organisations collect.
5.4 Similarity of Web Privacy Policies
Privacy policies follow a similar structure. We
noted that a few privacy policies had exactly the
same wording in multiple sections, differing only
by the organisation name.
We used the Simhash technique and Jaccard
Similarity Index to compare textual similarity in
privacy polices. We uniformly randomly sampled
11,000 documents from the corpus and created
Shingles of window size 3 for each document. We
then calculated the Jaccard Similarity Index be-
tween the first 1000 and the rest of the 10,000 doc-
uments in our random sample. We also calculated
the Simhash of each Shingled document and ob-
tained a 64 bit representation of each document.
We then calculated the Hamming distance between
the first 1000 and rest of the 10,000 documents.
The similarity of 10 million document pairs us-
ing the Jaccard Similarity Index is shown in Fig-
ure 6. The figure suggests that the majority of
document pairs are distinct while a small number
of privacy policies are very similar to each other.
Interpreted Topic Vocabulary
First Party Collection information, service, email, provide, address, use, personal, collect, user,
product, name, contact, number
Third Party Collection google, com, party, third, advertising, ad, website, http, analytics, data,
www, user, service, may, network, social, opt, facebook
Data Security and Contact information, us, personal, security, contact, access, please, secure, data,
request, protect, question
Policy Changes privacy, policy, site, website, use, information, change, service, may,
time, term, practice, link
European Audiences data, personal, processing, right, purpose, subject, consent, protection,
legal, interest, process, request, controller, gdpr, legitimate
Cookies and Tracking cookie, website, use, site, information, browser, may, web, data, user,
page, service, visit, computer, used, party, ip
Disclosure of Information information, service, may, party, third, use, personal, provide, product,
purpose, us, company, business, disclose, customer
Table 4: Vocabulary and interpreted topics for LDA based topic modelling
RAKE TextRank
personal information, privacy policy, personally
identifiable information, third party, please con-
tact us, email address, ip address, credit card in-
formation, google analytics
information, personal information, privacy, data
protection, third party, email address, web site,
service, ip address, phone number
Table 5: Top Keyphrases
Figure 6: Document similarity
Thousands of document pairs have a high index sug-
gesting that they share language at a sentence level
or even at a paragraph level. The results from com-
paring hamming distances were consistent with the
above finding and followed a normal distribution
with a mean Hamming distance of 30.9 bits and a
standard deviation 4.3 bits. It is not surprising that
the number of dissimilar pairs vastly overshadow
the number of similar ones as a single uniquely
written document will have a low similarity index
with all other documents in the corpus.
6 Conclusion
We created the first large scale corpus of website
privacy policies, PrivaSeer, consisting of just over
1M documents. We designed a novel pipeline that
was used to build the corpus, which included web
crawling, language detection, document classifi-
cation, duplicate removal, document cross veri-
fication, boilerplate removal, and near duplicate
removal.
Topic modelling and keyphrase extraction
showed the distribution of themes of privacy prac-
tices in privacy policies. Four out of the seven
topics found in the LDA dealt with first party and
third party collection of information, which sug-
gests their abundance in privacy policies.
The readability of privacy policies was found to
be consistent with prior research and verified that
privacy policies are long and difficult to compre-
hend and are at a college reading level. In addition,
we found that a number of privacy policies have
very similar phrasing.
Finally, we intend to release this corpus for fur-
ther research under a creative commons license and
to build a search engine for discovery.
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